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Abstract—In multiple attribute decision making (MADM),  
strategic weight manipulation is understood as a deliberate 
manipulation of attribute weights setting to achieve a desired 
ranking of alternatives. In this paper, we study the strategic 
weight manipulation in a group decision making context with 
interval attribute weights information. In group decision making, 
the revision of the decision makers’ original attribute weights 
information implies a cost (the difference between the original 
information and the revised one). Driven by a desire to minimize 
the cost, we propose the minimum cost strategic weight 
manipulation model, which is achieved via optimization 
approaches, with the 0-1 mixed linear programming model being 
proved appropriate in this context. Meanwhile, some desired 
properties to manipulate a strategic attribute weight based on the 
ranking range under interval attribute weights information are 
proposed. Finally, numerical analysis and simulation 
experiments are provided with a two-fold aim: (1) to verify the 
validity of the proposed models, and (2) to show the effects of 
interval attribute weights information and the unit cost, 
respectively, on the cost to manipulate strategic weights in the 
MADM in a group decision context. 
 
Keywords—multiple attribute decision making, strategic 
weight manipulation, minimum cost, interval attribute weights 
information 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Multiple attribute decision making (MADM) aims to obtain 
a ranking of alternatives based on their evaluation information 
regarding multiple attributes. MADM has received increasing 
attention in decision analysis [22, 37, 45, 46], and it has been 
applied in a wide range of fields [5, 8, 19, 33]. 
Attribute weights play an important role in the resolution of  
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MADM problems [28, 29]. Until now, there exist many 
approaches in the specialized literature on how to obtain the 
attribute weights in MADM. The existing approaches can 
mainly be divided into three categories [12]:  
(1) The subjective approach obtains the attribute weights 
according to the decision makers’ subjective preference 
information on the set of attributes. For example, Doyle et al. 
[15] proposed a direct rating (DR) method and a point 
allocation (PA) method; Barron and Barrett [1] investigated 
three rank-ordered methods; while Roberts and Goodwin [32] 
provided a rank order distribution (ROD) approach.  
(2) The objective approach determines the attribute weights 
by using objective decision matrix information and the 
entropy method [47]; or a TOPSIS-based method [48]; or  
some other mathematical programming based method [7, 35].  
(3) The integrated approach obtains the attribute weights 
according to both the decision makers’ subjective preference 
information and the objective decision matrix information. For 
example, Cook and Kress [10] proposed a preference- 
aggregation model; while Fan et al. [16], Horsky and Rao 
[20], Pekelman and Sen [30] constructed optimization-based 
models.  
Strategic manipulation or non-cooperative behavior in 
decision making describe those situations in which some 
decision makers dishonestly express opinions to enhance the 
chances of obtaining their most preferred alternatives. 
Strategic manipulation is a common phenomenon and has 
been analyzed in depth in different decision contexts. For 
example, Pelta et al. [31] and Yager [42, 43] have proposed 
aggregation approaches to defend against the strategic 
manipulation in group decision making (GDM); whereas 
Dong et al. [13], Palomares et al. [26], and Xu et al. [41] have 
investigated how to detect and manage a series of 
non-cooperative behaviors in GDM consensus reaching 
processes from different perspectives. 
As mentioned above, approaches to set attribute weights 
have been investigated intensively; however, in these 
approaches decision makers are assumed to be honest when 
expressing their preferences regarding attribute weights. 
Recently, Dong et al. [12] proposed the concept of strategic 
weight manipulation, in which a decision maker can be 
dishonest in the sense of setting attribute weights strategically 
to obtain his/her desired ranking of alternatives. Although this 
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work by Dong et al. is useful in MADM, there still exist issues 
that needs to be addressed:  
(1) In [12] the strategic weight manipulation was 
investigated in an individual decision making context. 
However, the increasing complexity of decision environments 
means that many practical decisions involve multiple decision 
makers. Additionally, the strategic weight manipulation 
investigated in [12] assumed no constraints on the weights and 
consequently the strategic attribute weights could be set freely 
as anyone of the domain values. However, decision makers 
often will present some attribute weights information [6, 21, 
23, 27] and thus some attributes weights information are 
partially known or subject to certain constraints. So, it is 
necessary to investigate the strategic weight manipulation in a 
group decision context in which attribute weights information 
are partially known.  
(2) When decision makers provide partially attribute 
weights information in a group decision context, it is more 
challenging for a manipulator to strategically set attribute 
weights because some decision makers may be reluctant to 
change their original attribute weight preferences. As a result, 
the manipulator needs to assume some cost for decision 
makers to revise their original attribute weight preferences. 
Driven by a desire to minimize the cost, it is necessary to 
investigate the strategic weight manipulation with minimum 
cost. 
In order to address these two issues, this paper proposes the 
strategic weight manipulation with minimum cost in a group 
decision making context with interval attribute weights 
information. The proposed methodology to achieve this 
consists of the  following main steps: 
 Attribute weights are considered partially known, and 
they are described by numerical intervals, i.e. interval 
attribute weights information is assumed. Additionally, 
multiple decision makers are assumed to be involved in the 
strategic weight manipulation. Following these assumption, 
this paper develops a new strategic weight manipulation 
model in a group decision context with interval attribute 
weights information. 
 A minimum cost model is developed to strategically set 
the attribute weights, by revising the decision makers’ 
original preferences of attribute weights to obtain a desired 
ranking of alternatives. Meanwhile, some desired properties 
with zero cost for manipulating strategic attribute weights 
are explored. Simulation experiments with real data are 
provided to show the effects of the interval attribute weights 
information and the unit cost, respectively, in the cost to 
manipulate strategic weights in the MADM in a group 
context. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 introduces some basic concepts regarding the MADM. 
Mixed 0-1 linear programming models to set a multiple 
attribute strategic weight vector with minimum cost are 
constructed in section 3. Section 4 presents numerical analysis 
and simulation experiments to justify the proposal put forward 
in the paper. Concluding remarks and future research agenda 
are included in Section 5. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
 This section introduces some basic knowledge regarding  
MADM and attribute weights. 
A. Classical MADM problem 
A classical MADM problem can be described as follows: 
let  be a finite set of alternatives,  
a set of predefined attributes, and  the 
weight vector of the attributes, where  and . Let  
be the decision matrix, where  denotes the 
attribute value associated with alternative  and attribute 
. The resolution process of a MADM problem includes, 
generally, two steps: 
(1) Normalization phase. Attributes are split into two 
categories: benefit attributes and cost attributes. The decision 
matrix  is transformed into a normalized decision 
matrix , where  
                                                         
(1) 
if  is a benefit attribute, while 
                                                          
(2) 
if  is a cost attribute. 
(2) Ranking of alternatives. Alternatives are ranked by 
associating them with an evaluation value , which is 
computed by a decision function  that assigns an overall 
evaluation to each alternative, i.e.  , 
with  being the attribute weight vector. It is 
worth mentioning at this point that the alternatives’ overall 
evaluation is frequently derived by fusing their attributes 
normalized decision values, i.e. by using as functions  an 
aggregation operator such as the weighted average (WA) or 
the ordered weighted average (OWA) operators [38, 44], 
which would result, respectively, in: 
                                   
(3) 
                            
(4) 
where  is the th largest value in . 
There exist various approaches to rank alternatives. 
However, as this paper is a continuation of the study presented 
in [12], the ranking approach used there is also employed here: 
let  be the set of the 
alternatives whose decision evaluation value is greater than 
that of the alternative , and  its cardinality. Then, the 
ranking position of the alternative  is 
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(5) 
B. Research problem: Attribute weights in a group decision 
context with interval attribute weights information 
As mentioned in Dong et al. [12], the setting of attribute 
weights has an important effect on the ranking of alternatives. 
Thus, a manipulator may strategically set the attribute weights 
to attain his/her desired ranking in the MADM. 
Generally, in real-life MADM problems, the decision matrix 
 is considered as representing objective information, 
with the attribute weights being set by one or more decision 
makers.  
We make the following assumption (1): 
(1) Let  be a set of decision makers and let 
 be the weight vector of the attributes 
associated with the decision maker  , where  and 
. The attribute weight vector  is determined as the 
average of all decision makers’ corresponding attribute weight 
vectors: 
                                                                          
(6) 
In MADM problems, because of time pressure or limited 
expertise, some decision makers might not be able to provide 
precise attribute weights but incomplete attribute weights 
instead [6, 21, 23, 26], i.e. some information on attributes 
weights may be unknown or represented as interval values. 
Usually, the basic forms of incomplete attribute weights 
include weak ranking, strict ranking, ranking multiples, 
interval form, ranking differences and bounded (see [21, 23, 
26]). In this paper, we consider interval attribute weights, i.e. 
the attribute weights are in some numerical intervals. 
Then, we make the following assumption (2): 
(2) The attribute weight vector  
associated with the decision maker , is an interval  
weight vector, i.e.  
                                                                       
(7) 
where . When conditions  
 and  are verified,  is 
said to be a normalized interval weight vector [37]. These 
conditions guarantee that there exists a weight vector 
 such that  and . 
When the decision makers have interval information of 
attribute weights, setting strategic attribute weights carries a 
cost as the original attribute weights information has to be 
revised, i.e. modified. Inspired by the classical minimum cost 
model [2, 3], in this paper we study the multiple attribute 
strategic weight manipulation with minimum cost in a GDM 
context with interval attribute weights information. Minimum 
cost strategic weight manipulation will be formulated and 
discussed in the next section. 
III. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE STRATEGIC WEIGHT MANIPULATION 
WITH MINIMUM COST 
This section contains: (1) the strategic weight manipulation 
with minimum cost in MADM, (ii) an approach based on the 
mixed 0-1 linear programming to obtain its optimal solution, 
and (iii) some desired properties.  
A. Basic ideas and model 
In this subsection, we introduce some basic ideas and 
construct an optimization-based model with minimum cost to 
find out the manipulator’s strategic weight vector to obtain 
his/her desired ranking of alternative(s). 
In this study, without loss of generality, we assume that the 
manipulator wants to manipulate the alternatives 
, where  and , to which the attribute 
weight vector  is to be strategically set. 
Let  be the original normalized 
interval attribute weights vector associated with the decision 
maker . In order to strategically set the attribute weight 
vector , the manipulator hopes that the 
decision makers can revise their original interval information 
regarding attribute weight vectors. Let us denote by 
 the revised attribute weight vector 
associated with the decision maker , where  and 
. The difference between the original and the revised 
attribute weight vector associated with the decision maker  
can be measured by 
                                                   
(8) 
where 
                             
(9) 
Motivated by the minimum cost model, setting strategic 
attribute weights means the manipulator needs to take some 
cost for the decision makers to revise their original interval 
attribute weights information. Let  be the unit cost to revise 
the decision maker ’s attribute weight. The unit cost is a 
basic concept of minimum cost GDM models [17, 18, 24, 51, 
53], and refers to the cost for the decision makers adjusting the 
unit opinions. Usually, the unit cost can be measured by 
money, time and so on. In practical GDM context, the 
manipulator often assumes the cost to persuade the decision 
makers in changing their opinions, and the finalized 
measurement for the cost is determined by the specified 
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decision making problem. Generally, the greater the distance 
of experts changing their opinion, the greater the cost. Thus, 
the cost function of revising the decision maker ’s attribute 
weight can be defined as the product of the unit cost and 
distance of opinions changing, . Thus, the cost 
function of revising all the decision makers’ attribute weights 
can be denoted as Eq. (10) 
                                       
(10) 
It is assumed that the manipulator aims to minimize the 
cost, that is 
                                                         
(11) 
Meanwhile, following Eq. (6), the attribute weight vector 
strategically set by the manipulator is determined as follows: 
                                                                        
(12) 
Moreover, we assume the manipulator’s desired ranking of 
the alternatives  is , i.e. 
                                           
(13) 
Based on Eqs. (8-13), we construct the minimum cost 
strategic weight manipulation (MCSWM) model to set the 
strategic weight vector as follows: 
              
(14) 
where are the decision 
variables. 
B. Solving the minimum cost strategic weight manipulation 
model via mixed 0-1 linear programming 
In this subsection, we continue to use a mixed 0-1 linear 
programming methodology to obtain the optimal solution to 
the MCSWM (model (14)).  
In order to transform model (14) into a mixed 0-1 linear 
programming, binary variable  and a large enough 
number  are introduced. We have the following results: 
(1)  if and only if  under the conditions: 
 and .  
(2)  if and only if  under the conditions: 
 and . 
The following Lemmas are proposed: 
Lemma 1: For decision function with  the WA operator 
as per Eq. (3), if there exists  satisfying 
constraint conditions (15)-(23)   
 
then, . 
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix B. 
Lemma 2: For decision function with  the OWA operator 
as per Eq. (4), if there exists  satisfying 
constraint conditions (17)-(25)    
then, . 
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix B. 
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the following 
Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1: By introducing the transformed decision 
variables:  ,  
, we have 
(1) If  is a WA operator, the MCSWM (model (14)) can 
be transformed into the mixed 0-1 linear programming 
(26)-(42). 
ke
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    (2) In (26)-(42) above, substitute constraints (27)-(28) into 
constraints (43)-(44) 
 
If  is an OWA operator, the MCSWM (model (14)) can 
be transformed into the mixed 0-1 linear programming model 
(26), (29)-(44). 
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix B. 
In this paper, denote models (26)-(42) as , and models 
(26), (29)-(44) as . In both  and  models,  
;   
 are the decision variables.  
Based on Theorem 1, we can obtain the optimal solution to 
the MCSWM via mixed 0-1 linear programming. Clearly, if 
the optimal solution to the MCSWM exists, a manipulator can 
set a strategic weight vector to obtain his/her desired ranking 
of the alternatives . Otherwise, it is not possible to 
strategically manipulate the attribute weights to achieve 
his/her goal. 
C. Some desired properties for models  and   
In this subsection, we present some desired properties of the 
MCSWM. In order to make the proposed properties easy to 
understand, we first introduce the ranking range of an 
alternative. 
In a MADM problem, let  
be the set of attribute weights without any constraint; 
 the best ranking of alternative  under ; 
and  the worst ranking of alternative  
under . Then,  is called the ranking 
range of alternative  under the set of attribute weights . 
Let  
  be the set of interval attribute weights; 
 the best ranking of alternative  under ; 
and  the worst ranking of alternative  
under . Then,  is called the ranking 
range of alternative  under the set of interval attribute 
weights . 
Specifically, when the WA operator , as per Eq. (3), is 
used to compute the decision evaluation function, let 
 and  be the 
ranking range under  and , respectively. When OWA 
operator , as per Eq. (4), is used to compute the decision 
evaluation function, let  and 
 be the ranking range under  and , 
respectively. 
Then, the following three desired properties to manipulate 
the attribute weights are presented as Properties 1-3. 
Property 1: For a desired ranking , we 
have that  
(1) if the objective value of  is zero, then 
 . 
(2) if the objective value of  is zero, then 
 . 
The proof of Property 1 is provided in Appendix B. 
Property 1 provides the necessary condition that make 
possible for a manipulator to manipulate a strategic attribute 
weight with zero cost to obtain a desired ranking of 
alternatives under the WA and OWA operators, respectively. 
Property 2: When , we have that  
(1) if the objective value of  is zero if and only if 
. 
(2) if the objective value of  is zero if and only if 
. 
The proof of Property 2 is provided in Appendix B. 
Property 2 provides the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a manipulator to manipulate a strategic attribute weight 
with zero cost to obtain any desired ranking of one alternative 
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Property 3: For a desired ranking , we 
have that  
(1) the solution of model  does not exist if it satisfies the 
condition , .  
(2) the solution of model  does not exist if it satisfies the 
condition , . 
The proof of Property 3 is provided in Appendix B. 
Property 3 provides the condition under which a 
manipulator cannot manipulate a strategic weight vector under 
any cost to obtain his/her desired ranking. 
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
In this section, we present an example with real data 
(provided in Appendix C) from the Academic Ranking of 
World Universities (ARWU; http://www.arwu.org/) [34] and 
several simulation experiments to show the validity and 
desired properties of the proposed minimum cost strategic 
weight manipulation model. 
A. Numerical analysis 
Let 50 Universities taken from ARWU be the set of 
alternatives , which will be ranked using the 
following set of 6 attributes :  
: Quality of Education (Alumni: Alumni of an institution 
winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals);  
: Quality of Faculty 1 (Award: Staff of an institution 
winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals);  
: Quality of Faculty 2 (HiCi: Highly Cited researchers in 
21 broad subject categories);  
: Papers published in Nature and Science (N&S);  
: Papers indexed in Science Citation Index-expanded and 
Social Science Citation Index (PUB);  
:Per capita academic performance of an institution 
(PCP). 
First, we transform the data for the 50 universities regarding 
the set of attributes above into a normalized decision matrix 
. Let  be a set of 3 experts. Let 
, where  and 
 be the interval attribute weights of 
expert ; , where  and 
  be the interval attribute weights of 
expert ; and , where  
 and  be the interval attribute 
weights of expert .  
Without loss of generality, let , be the unit 
cost of revising decision maker’s original attribute weights. In 
the following, we assume that an expert wants to manipulate 
the alternative , and his/her desired ranking for such 
alternative is . Then, based on models  and , the 
manipulator can strategically set an attribute weight vector  
with minimum cost , to obtain his/her desired goal of 
ranking. For example: 
(1) Let  be the manipulated alternative, and  the 
corresponding desired ranking. If  is the WA operator, then 
this is possible as  results in the following strategic attribute 
weight vector with minimum 
cost ;  
(2) Let  be the manipulated alternative, and  
the corresponding desired ranking. If is the OWA operator, 
then this is possible as  results in the following strategic 
weight vector  with minimum 
cost ; 
(3) Let  be the manipulated alternatives, and 
 their corresponding desired ranking. If is 
WA operator, then this is possible with  resulting in the 
following strategic weight vector 
 with minimum cost ; 
(4) Let  be the manipulated alternatives, 
and  their desired ranking. If  is OWA 
operator, then because there is no solution to , the 
manipulator will be unable to strategically set an attribute 
weight vector to achieve the desired ranking. 
Table 1 shows a strategic weight vector  with its 
corresponding minimum cost  for different manipulated 
alternative(s)  to achieve a desired ranking . 
 
Table 1: Strategic weight vector  with minimum cost  




alternative(s)    
 3  0 
 10  0.019 
 9   No solution ~ 
 
 No solution ~ 
  0.382 
 
 No solution ~ 
  0 
 
  0.667 
 No solution ~ 
OWA 
Manipulated 
alternative(s)    
 8  1.37 
 6  0 
 15  0.57 
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8 13 14 15{ , , , }x x x x
{2,6,10,12}
{46,23,24,13} (0.06,0.08,0,0.01,0.85,0)
9 10 11 12{ , , , }x x x x
{6,7,8,9}
{6,8,9,10} (0.12,0.2,0,0.13,0.54,0)









 No solution ~ 
  0.357 
 
  0.198 
 No solution ~ 
 
  0.069 
 No solution ~ 
 
From Table 1, it can be noticed that in some cases the 
manipulator incurred zero cost ( ) to set a strategic 
weight vector to obtain his/her goal. On the other hand, in 
some other cases the manipulator is unable to set a strategic 
weight vector under any cost. In the following, we will verify 
the validity of the conditions presented in Properties 1-3. 
Table 2 shows the ranking ranges , ，  and  
for the 50 universities. 
 
Table 2: Ranking ranges , ，  and  for 50 
universities 
       
 [1,2] [2,11] [2,13] [2,14]  [2,25] [2,47] 
 [1,2] [2,7]  [2,9] [2,5]  [2,7] [2,9] 
 [1,1] [2,4] [3,5] [2,5]  [2,5] [6,9] 
 [1,1] [2,2]  [4,5] [4,5]  [3,3] [6, 6] 
       
 [2,9] [1,47] [4,28] [4,42] [5,26] [4,27]  
 [5,11] [1,9] [6,17] [6,12]  [8,24] [10,19]  
 [7,9] [6,11] [6,8]  [8,11]  [8,11] [12,15] 
 [8,8] [7,7] [9,9]  [10,10]  [11,11] [12,12]  
       
 [9,28] [5,36] [5,36] [7,33] [5,30] [9,28] 
 [8,30] [11,31] [11,31] [10,25] [10,30] [13,27]  
 [12,14] [12,15] [14,16] [13,16] [17,20]  [20,21]  
 [13,13]  [14,14] [17,22] [15,15] [16,20]  [16,21]  
       
 [8,38] [10,43]  [11,50] [10,46] [3,50] [9,46] 
 [13,36] [15,34]  [15,50] [18,43] [9,50] [15,46] 
 [17,19] [17,20] [19,21] [25,31] [22,33] [22,29] 
 [16,22] [23,25]  [16,21]  [22,23] [16,24]  [16,23] 
       
 [5,49] [8,45] [2,48] [15,48]  [22,50] [9,47] 
 [13,48] [14,43]  [8,48] [19,44]  [23,41] [20,42] 
 [27,35]  [31,37]  [22,26]  [22,25]  [22,26]  [28,35] 
 [26,34]  [24,25]  [26,34] [26,29]  [27,31] [26,29]  
       
 [17,43] [16,50] [16,50] [16,49] [22,48] [22,49]  
 [17,43] [21,43] [20,41] [22,48]  [27,43] [25,49]  
 [27,31] [25,31] [33,39] [35,41] [38,49] [36,43]  
 [29,35]  [30,34]  [32,35] [36,40] [36,38] [29,34] 
       
 [10,50] [21,49] [15,50] [13,50] [27,49] [15,50] 
 [20,48] [22,49] [24,49] [18,50] [33,50] [24,50]  
 [23,40] [32,38] [29,36] [44,49] [41,44] [45,49] 
 [38,43] [27,35] [38,42] [41,48] [45,48] [36,42] 
       
 [22,50] [13,50]  [28,50] [11,50] [21,50] [15,50] 
 [26,50] [23,50]  [37,50] [22,50] [29,49] [24,49] 
 [37,45] [45,47] [37,42] [30,44] [42,44] [46,49] 
 [40,48] [40,44] [47,49] [36,42] [46,49] [42,44] 
       
 [27,50] [30,50]         
 [38,49] [30,50]      
 [47,50] [49,50]     
 [45,49] [50,50]     
 
Based on the data from Tables 1 and 2, we find the results 
to be consistent with Properties 1-3. 
B. Numerical analysis 
In this subsection, we present simulation experiments to 
analyse the effect the interval attribute weights and the unit 
cost have on the MCSWM. 
(1) The effect of interval attribute weights 
First, we consider the constraints for the attribute weights. 
Let  be a set of 
interval attribute weights, where   and 
 . In the other words, set  constraints 
only the weight of an attribute  with . In Simulation 
Experiment I below, set  is randomly generated, and thus 
the bigger the value  the more constraints on attribute 
weights there are, in the sense of average cases. 
Let  be the manipulator’s desired ranking of the 
alternative , and   the unit cost to revise the 
expert ’s original interval attribute weights. Let  
and  be the minimum cost to find out a strategic 
weight vector from the set  to obtain the manipulator’s 
desired goal ranking of alternative  under the WA and the 
OWA operators, respectively. 
Next, we design Simulation Experiment I to analyse the 
effect of interval attribute weights on the minimum cost to 
manipulate a strategic weight vector. Without loss of 
generality, we set  and set the manipulated 
alternative to be .  
 
Simulation Experiment I: 
Input:  and  
Output:  and  
Step 1: (generation of the standardized decision matrix): 
Generate randomly a standardized decision matrix , 
where . 
8 13 14 15{ , , , }x x x x
{10,11,12,13}
{6,12,13,14} (0.1,0.07,0.63,0.01,03,0.07)
9 10 11 12{ , , , }x x x x
{8,9,10,11} (0.03,0.83,0,0.13,0.01,0)
{19,7,27,16}
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Step 2: (generation of the desired ranking of the alternative 
): Apply methods from Dong et al. [12] to obtain the 
ranking ranges of the alternative  and 
 for the WA and the OWA operators, 
respectively. Let  be the manipulator’s desired ranking 
of the alternative . When using the WA operator, the value 
of  is randomly selected from . When 
using the OWA operator, the value of  is randomly 
selected from .   
Step 3: (generation of the interval attribute weights sets ): 
Generate randomly a set of interval attribute weights 
: generate a random integer 
number j from set ; generate random values 
 and  from  and , 
respectively, and set  . Apply models  
and  to obtain  and , respectively. Compute 
the minimum cost  and  to find out a strategic 
weight vector from the set  to obtain the manipulator’s 
desired goal ranking of alternative  under the WA and the 
OWA operators, respectively.  
We set different values of , and , and run  100 times 
Simulation Experiment I to obtain average values of  
and , which are shown in  Fig.1 below. 
 
 Fig. 1. Average values of  and  under different 
parameters in Simulation Experiments I. 
 
Clearly, Fig. 1 shows that: (i) in all cases, the average 
minimum cost to set strategic weight vectors under the WA 
operator is smaller than that under the OWA operator; and (ii) 
the average minimum cost to set strategic weight vectors 
under the OWA operator increase more quickly than that 
under the WA operator, as the attribute weights constraints 
increase.  
(2) The effect of the unit cost 
In Simulation Experiment II, we assumed that the unit cost 
to revise the original attribute weights information is the same 
for all experts, i.e. , and respectively set as 
 to study the effect of unit cost on 
the minimum cost to strategically manipulate the attribute 
weight vector in the MCSWM. Clearly, the larger the value of 
, the higher the unit cost is.  
Let  be the manipulator’s desired ranking of the 
alternative . When setting , let  be the 
minimum cost to find out a strategic weight vector from a set 
of interval attribute weights to achieve the manipulator’s 
desired goal ranking of alternative  under the WA and the 
OWA operators, respectively. Without loss of generality, we 
set the manipulated alternative to be  and the sets of interval 
attribute weights are generated randomly.       
 
Simulation Experiment II: 
Input:  and  
Output:  and  
Step 1: Same to Step 1 in Simulation Experiment I.  
Step 2: Same to Step 2 in Simulation Experiment I.  
Step 3: (generation of the interval attribute weights sets ):  
Generate the set of interval attribute weights 
 by randomly 
selecting  and  from  and , respectively.  
Step 4: (calculation of the minimum cost  and 
): Set  and . Apply 
models  and  to obtain  and , 
respectively. Compute the minimum cost  and 
 to find out a strategic weight vector from the set  
to obtain the manipulator’s desired goal ranking of alternative 
 under  the WA and the OWA operators, respectively.  
We set different values of  and , and run 100 times  
Simulation Experiment II to obtain average values of  
and , which are depicted in Fig.2. 
 
 
  Fig. 2. Average values of  and  under 
different parameters in Simulation Method II. 
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As with Simulation Method I, it is evident from Fig.2 that: 
(i) in all cases the average minimum cost to set strategic 
weight vectors under the OWA operator is larger than that 
under the WA operator; and (ii) as the unit cost increases, the 
average minimum cost to set strategic weight vectors under 
the OWA operator increases more quickly than that under the 
WA operator.  
Simulation Methods I and II both show a better 
performance of the OWA operator than the WA operator in 
defending against the strategic weight manipulation of the 
MADM problems because of the higher associated minimum 
cost. Furthermore, as the attribute weights constraints and the 
unit cost increase, the performance of the OWA operator as a 
defense mechanism against the strategic weight manipulation 
increases faster than if the WA operator were used instead. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the OWA operator 
provides a better defense mechanism than the WA operator 
against multiple attribute strategic weight manipulation with 
interval attribute weights information. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper focuses on the strategic weight manipulation 
with minimum cost to obtain a desired ranking of alternatives, 
in a group decision context with interval attribute weights 
information. The existing approaches to set attribute weights 
have been investigated intensively, however, in these 
approaches decision makers are assumed to be honest aiming 
to obtain "best" attribute weights to get a ranking of 
alternatives. This paper follows the new assumption presented 
in [12] that the decision makers are not honest to strategically 
set attribute weights to obtain their desired ranking of the 
alternatives. The main contributions presented in this paper 
are: 
(1) The strategic weight manipulation issue in [12] was 
investigated in an individual decision making context with no 
constraints on the attribute. In this paper, we present the 
minimum cost strategic weight manipulation model in a group 
decision context with interval attribute weights information.  
(2) We discuss the conditions based on the ranking range 
under interval attribute weights information for (i) the 
existence of a weight vector to be set strategically to achieve 
the manipulator’s desired ranking, and (ii) zero cost for the 
manipulation.  
(3) We present detailed simulation experiments to reveal the 
effects of the attribute weights information and the unit cost on 
the minimum cost to manipulate strategic weights in a group 
context. 
Meanwhile, we argue that it will be an interesting future 
research topic to investigate multiple attribute strategic weight 
manipulation in a consensus-reaching context [14, 49, 50] and 
the presence of trust relationship [39, 40].  
APPENDIX A. NOTATIONS  
The main notations in this paper are as follows. 
: The set of alternatives; 
: The set of attributes; 
: The set of experts; 
: Decision matrix; 
: Standardized decision matrix; 
: The evaluation function of alternative  with 
weight vector ; 
: The weight vector of attribute weights; 
: The original attribute weight vector over expert ; 
: The revised attribute weight vector associated with 
expert ; 
: The ranking of alternative  under attribute weight 
vector ; 
: The attribute weights set without any constraint; 
: The best ranking of alternative  under the set 
of attribute weights ; 
: The worst ranking of alternative  under the set 
of attribute weights ; 
: Ranking range under the set 
of attribute weights ; 
: Ranking range under the set 
of attribute weights  associated with the WA operator; 
: Ranking range under the set 
of attribute weights  associated with the OWA operator; 
: The set of interval information of attribute weights; 
: The best ranking of alternative  under the set 
of interval attribute weights ; 
: The worst ranking of alternative  under the set 
of interval attribute weights ; 
: Ranking range under the set of 
interval attribute weights  associated with the WA operator; 
: Ranking range under the set 
of interval attribute weights  associated with the OWA 
operator; 
APPENDIX B. PROOFS 
Proof of Lemma 1:                        
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Substitute  into the first and second constraints, then 
 and   can 
be obtained. According to the result (1) in subsection 3.1, 
 can be guaranteed. If then 
 and  . 
According to result (2) in subsection 3.1,   
can be guaranteed. The strategic weight vector  can be 
obtained by revising the decision maker’s original attribute 
weights, so the distance  should be given. Due to 
the non-negative property of distance functions, we can obtain 
different distance formula for the different ranges of , i.e. 
 .   
Finally, the constraint condition 
 can guarantee 
 .  
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Substitute the WA operator  and 
 into the OWA operator 
 and  in proof 
of Lemma 1 and conclude that . 
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
Introduce the following transformed decision variables , 
with  or 1 . 
Because ,  
  
then, the mix 0-1 formulas 
  and  guarantee 
 
 and  guarantee  
 
  and  guarantee 
  
Then, we have . 
According to Lemmas 1 and 2, plug models (15)-(23) and 
(17)-(25) into model (14) and transform the optimization 
models into the mixed 0-1 linear programming models 
(26)-(42) and (26), (29)-(44), respectively. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
 
Proof of Property 1: 
Assuming that , the 
objective value of  is non-zero, which means the 
manipulator must take some cost to revise the decision 
maker’s original attribute weights. However, the condition 
  means the manipulator can obtain 
his/her ranking in the ranking range under the original interval 
attribute weights information. The above two results are in 
contradiction. This completes the proof of Property 1. 
 
Proof of Property 2: 
Sufficiency: When ,  means 
the manipulator can obtain his/her ranking in the ranking 
range under the original interval attribute weights information, 
it is evident that the objective value of  is zero. 
Necessity: The proof  is same to the proof of Property 1. 
Similarly, we can prove the property of model . 
Then, this completes the proof of Property 2. 
 
Proof of Property 3: 
Assuming that , 
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manipulator can set strategic weight to achieve his/her desired 
ranking. However, according to the definition of ranking range 
under attribute weights ,  means the 
ranking of alternative manipulator  vary in this range. The 
above two results are in contradiction. This completes the 
proof of Property 3. 
APPENDIX C. THE ORIGINAL DATA FOR 50 UNIVERSITIES 
       
1 100 100 100 100 100 79.2 
2 42.9 89.6 80.1 73.6 73.1 55.8 
3 65.1 79.4 64.9 68.7 68.4 59 
4 78.3 96.6 51.3 56.7 67.8 58.5 
5 69.4 80.7 55.3 71.7 61.7 69.7 
6 53.3 98 51.3 47.2 42.9 74.4 
7 49.7 54.9 56.2 55 74.5 46.1 
8 51 66.7 39.7 57.3 43.6 100 
9 63.5 65.9 41 53.3 68.9 33.3 
10 59.8 86.3 34 42.7 50.2 44.5 
11 47.6 50.4 44.7 58.4 62.6 37.1 
12 29.5 47.1 58 44.5 71.4 33.4 
13 42 49.8 41 47 60.5 40.9 
14 19.2 35.5 49.2 57.8 63.5 37 
15 21.2 31.6 49.2 52.1 72.6 31 
16 37.7 33.6 38.4 47 71.9 31.1 
17 28.1 36.2 41 41.6 73.9 32.4 
18 31.6 33.8 42.3 39.4 67.7 37.8 
19 29.5 35.5 35.5 50.2 55.6 46.1 
20 36.3 25.3 30.8 47.5 70 29.7 
21 0 39.9 37 52.1 59.3 33.5 
22 14.5 35.8 43.5 32.9 64 39.9 
23 34.4 0 51.3 41.6 76.6 25.8 
24 34.4 24.9 51.3 42 51.7 37.2 
25 15.4 19.2 57.1 38.9 62.1 25.9 
26 15.4 22.1 54.3 35.6 59.6 32.8 
27 19.9 17.2 32.4 38.2 80.1 30.3 
28 32.8 34.8 30.8 35 62.7 24.3 
29 28.1 31.9 32.4 39.5 57.3 22 
30 21.8 18.8 32.4 36.2 65.2 41.9 
31 29.9 36.2 30.8 33.1 55.1 29.1 
32 31.6 37.2 27.1 31.5 58.4 23.8 
33 29.5 16.3 39.7 32.5 64.8 24.1 
34 15.4 18.8 42.3 32.7 64.5 27.2 
35 18.5 32.6 37 26.4 58.4 29 
36 8.9 23.7 39.7 32.6 60.8 33.8 
37 17 59.8 27.1 41.8 19.3 40 
38 12.6 34.1 30.8 36.8 46.2 35.1 
39 33.6 27.4 20.5 29.7 61.9 25.3 
40 17 13.3 35.5 24.8 67.9 32.2 
41 20.5 24.9 32.4 31.3 52.1 26.8 
42 14.5 39.1 32.4 27.3 37.7 38.2 
43 18.5 34.5 30.8 37.6 34.9 27.7 
44 25.6 26.6 22.9 25.1 52.6 40.2 
45 16.2 16.3 29 37 56.3 26.6 
46 30.3 54.3 10.3 17.6 47.9 27.7 
47 19.9 25.3 22.9 30.6 51.8 34.9 
48 34.8 21.6 29 23.3 49.7 34.6 
49 0 31.7 35.5 23.4 53.9 26.2 
50 21.2 21 34 19.6 55.3 27.9 
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